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The Impact of Testing on the Formation of Children’s and Adults’ False Memories
NATHALIE BRACKMANN1,2*, HENRY OTGAAR1, MELANIE SAUERLAND1 and
MARK L. HOWE1,3
1Section Forensic Psychology, Department of Clinical Psychological Science, Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht
University, the Netherlands
2Department of Psychology, Gothenburg University, Sweden
3Department of Psychology, City University London, UK
Summary: Witnesses are frequently questioned immediately following a crime. The effects of such testing on false recall are
inconclusive: Testing may inoculate against subsequent misinformation or enhance false memory formation. We examined whether
different types of processing can account for these discrepancies. Drawing from Fuzzy-trace and Associative-activation theories,
immediate questions that trigger the processing of the global understanding of the event can heighten false memory rates.
However, questions that trigger the processing of specific details can inoculate memories against subsequent misinformation.
These effects were hypothesized to be more pronounced in children than in adults. Seven/eight-, 11/12-, 14/15-year-olds, and adults
(N= 220) saw a mock-theft film and were tested immediately with meaning or item-specific questions. Test results on the
succeeding day replicated classic misinformation and testing effects, although our processing hypothesis was not supported. Only
adults who received meaning questions benefited from immediate testing and, across all ages, testing led to retrieval-enhanced
suggestibility. © 2016 The Authors. Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Witnesses to a crime frequently recall their experiences
numerous times. They may immediately talk about the event
to other witnesses or to the emergency staff arriving at the
crime scene, may be interviewed by investigators later, and
may be asked to tell their story in court several years later.
To assess the reliability of witnesses’ recollections, it is
essential to examine whether such repeated interviews
strengthen or distort memory traces. The current experiment
addressed the issue of immediate testing and its influence on
the development of erroneous recollections.
What we know about repeated interviewing is based
largely on empirical studies that investigate how testing
affects long-term memory performance. Immediate testing
has been found to enhance memory retrieval on subsequent
memory tasks compared to mere repeated learning of the
to-be-remembered material (see Roediger & Karpicke,
2006, for a review). For example, children who answered
multiple-choice and free recall questions after a lesson
achieved higher correct recall scores on a later test than
children who used the same time to restudy the material
(Roediger & Butler, 2011). Furthermore, in the field of
eyewitness interviewing, the immediate completion of the
structured Self-Administered Interview (SAI) yielded more
correct information than free recall or no initial retrieval on
an interview one week later (Hope, Gabbert, Fisher, &
Jamieson, 2014; Krix, Sauerland, Gabbert, & Hope, 2014).
Thus, immediate testing seems to enhance the retention of
correct information, and, consequently, yields a beneficial
testing effect.
Intriguingly, the impact of testing on incorrect (as opposed
to correct) recall has only recently become a subject of inter-
est, and the results so far are inconclusive (e.g., LaPaglia,
2013). Recollections may be tainted by memory distortion
processes that lead to erroneous statements. Much of the
research on such false memories1 has concentrated on the
formation of memory illusions triggered by the presentation
of erroneous or misleading information (also referred to as
misinformation) without directly examining the effect of
testing as a moderating variable. An increase in incorrect
recall or recognition for items that were misled compared
to non-misled control items has been dubbed the misinfor-
mation effect. A standard procedure used to induce such
erroneous recollections is the misinformation paradigm.
Here, participants first see a stimulus event (e.g., a video of
an armed robbery; Van Bergen, Horselenberg, Merckelbach,
Jelicic, & Beckers, 2010), are then misinformed about items
depicted in the event (e.g., an incorrect number of people
present in the video), and are subsequently asked what they
remember (see Loftus, 2005, for a review). Furthermore,
the misinformation effect is more pronounced in younger
children compared to older children and adults (see Bruck
& Ceci, 1999, for a review).
Memory research has suggested that testing might not
only positively affect correct recall but also protect against
the production of false memories. Researchers argue that
taking a test strengthens the memory trace for a specific
event, which in turn reduces the impact of forgetting and
external misinformation (e.g., Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich,
2009). In support of the protective value of testing, studies
have frequently found an inoculation effect against misinfor-
mation (e.g., Pansky & Tenenboim, 2011; Wang, Paterson,
& Kemp, 2014). In one of these studies, participants filled
out the SAI immediately after seeing a video of a robbery
(Gabbert, Hope, Fisher, & Jamieson, 2012, Experiment 1).
One week later, misinformation was introduced via a mock
report on a news homepage. On a final free-recall test, the
SAI group demonstrated significantly higher correct recall
rates and were less affected by the negative effects of
1 Please note that we use the term false memories to refer to false recollec-
tions of entire events as well as recollections of erroneous details.
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misinformation compared to a control group that did not fill
out the SAI prior to the misinformation.
Although these findings seem to show that testing may
guard against the production of false memories, other studies
have challenged this conclusion. That is, recent studies have
demonstrated elevated false memory rates after taking a test
(e.g., Chan & Langley, 2011; Chan & LaPaglia, 2011;
Gordon & Thomas, 2014; Wilford, Chan, & Tuhn, 2014).
This effect, labeled retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (Chan
et al., 2009), may be related to two underlying mechanisms:
a focus on the misinformed items or the overwriting of the
original memory trace because of testing. The former
mechanism represents a preference for the newly stored
(erroneous) information, while the latter causes the previ-
ously stored (correct) information to become inaccessible.
Both processes disturb the reconsolidation of the original
event and lead to higher false memory rates following the
introduction of misinformation (Chan & Langley, 2011). In
one of the studies that demonstrated retrieval-enhanced
suggestibility, even the use of the Cognitive Interview (CI)
increased the susceptibility to misinformation considerably
(LaPaglia, Wilford, Rivard, Chan, & Fisher, 2014). Specifi-
cally, LaPaglia and colleagues’ participants completed either
the CI, a free-recall test, or a distractor task after seeing the
video of a theft. After all participants had seen a distractor
video, they listened to a summary of the theft that included
misinformation. Correct recall rates were highest in the CI
group, but so too were false memory rates. The authors
suggest that the initial retrieval of information using the CI
might have heightened participants’ awareness of memory
strengths and weaknesses. While listening to the post-event
summary, this awareness has supposedly let to a focus on
the conflicting information or information that filled in
knowledge gabs and therefore promoted the acceptance
of erroneous post-event information. These results are
important because the CI is a generally accepted structured
interview instrument that enhances correct recall without
undermining overall accuracy (Memon, Meissner, & Fraser,
2010). Although it is known that the CI is accompanied by
small increases in incorrect recall (Memon et al., 2010), its
aggravating effect on the proneness to subsequent misinfor-
mation is new.
One way to resolve these contrasting findings (inoculation
vs. retrieval-enhanced suggestibility) is to consider the
methodological details in those studies. These include delay
between the event and testing (Pansky, 2012) or the intro-
duction of misinformation (Chan & LaPaglia, 2011), recall
type (cued recall vs. free recall; Wang et al., 2014), form
of misinformation (questions vs. narratives; LaPaglia &
Chan, 2013), and contextual embedding of misinformation
(LaPaglia, 2013). One factor that has rarely been examined
is how information (i.e., the type of processing) is retrieved
in the testing phase (but see Pansky & Tenenboim, 2011).
According to Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT, Brainerd, Reyna,
& Ceci, 2008) and Associative-Activation Theory (AAT,
Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Otgaar, Howe,
Peters, Smeets, & Moritz, 2014), different types of process-
ing are directly linked to the formation of false memories.
FTT postulates that when witnessing an event, at least two
memory traces are stored in parallel. One trace captures the
underlying meaning and understanding of an event, the gist
information, and the other trace stores item-specific details,
the verbatim information. For instance, when witnessing a
robbery, the gist trace captures that a weapon was involved
while the verbatim trace stores what kind of weapon (a black
object out of which bullets were shot, accompanied with
noise). According to FTT, false memories are caused by a
reliance on gist traces when retrieval of verbatim traces is
not possible. Similarly, in AAT, both item-specific and
relational (meaning) information is stored following an
event, although both are stored in a single integrated memory
trace. AAT links the production of false memories to an
automatic activation of neighboring information in one’s
knowledge base. Thus, being confronted with a pistol
simultaneously activates knowledge about other weapons.
If relational information swamps item-specific information in
memory and during retrieval, then memory illusions can
prevail on tests of recall and recognition. According to both
theories, the witness might erroneously infer that a knife was
the weapon used in the robbery. Although earlier research
has mainly focused on the formation of spontaneous false
memories (see Brainerd et al., 2008 for an overview), newer
studies also link AAT and FTT to misinformation induced
false memories (Otgaar, Howe, Brackmann, & Smeets, 2016).
Pansky and Tenenboim (2011) reasoned that only imme-
diate testing on the item-specific (verbatim) and not on the
relational or meaning (gist) level protects against misinfor-
mation while simultaneously heightening correct recall. In
their study, adult participants first viewed a slide show
depicting a normal day of a student. Subsequently, half of
the participants had to answer one cued question that needed
a one-word response (e.g., What did Inbal drink at the neigh-
borhood pub?), while the other half of participants received a
follow-up question to further specify the previous answer in
a two-word response (i.e., What kind of wine?). The one-
word response was supposed to reflect meaning processing
and the two-word response item-specific processing.2 After
a delay of two days, participants received misinformation
embedded in questions and then completed a final cued
recall test on the item-specific processing level. False
memory rates for the misinformed items that were tested
with the two-word response approach were comparable to
those obtained for the non-misinformed items. For the
misinformed items that were tested with the one-word
response approach, the false memory rates were significantly
higher than for the non-misinformed items. Accordingly,
only immediate item-specific questioning (two-word
response approach) and not meaning questioning (one-word
response approach) yielded an inoculation effect against
misinformation.
Drawing from both practical and theoretical considerations,
we extended Pansky and Tenenboim’s (2011) approach in
the current experiment. More specifically, we examined
the effect of meaning versus item-specific testing on the
susceptibility to misinformation from a developmental angle.
2 Note that Pansky and Tenenboim (2011) used the terms verbatim and gist
level to differentiate between their groups. To be consistent throughout the
document, we refer to item-speciﬁc and meaning level, respectively. This
is in line with the deﬁnition put forward by Hunt and Einstein (1981).
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Children and adolescents may witness a crime and, like
adults, be confronted with immediate questions about the
witnessed event. Moreover, both AAT and FTT predict
developmental changes in false memory rates. In FTT (see
Brainerd & Reyna, 2004, for a review), the ability to extract
the underlying meaning of an event (gist) develops more
slowly with age compared to the ability to capture the
item-specific (verbatim) details of an experience. In AAT
(see Howe et al., 2009; Otgaar et al., 2014), children make
fewer meaning-based inferences because their knowledge
base (e.g., associative networks, script knowledge) is less
developed than that of older children or adults. Thus,
younger children have a less developed understanding of
typical connections than adults and false memories that are
because of reliance on understanding the meaning (gist) of
an event increase with age.
Because of the importance of these developmental
changes in memory illusions, we included children, adoles-
cents, and adults in the current study. We triggered meaning
or item-specific processing via immediate testing on several
items after participants saw a video of a theft. Although all
participants answered the same general questions, these
questions were either followed by a question focussing on
the underlying meaning (meaning group) or by a question
focussing on specific details (item-specific group). On a
subsequent testing day, we introduced misinformation for
some items using a fictitious eyewitness account that
summarized the video. Finally, all participants answered
memory questions to assess memory for the original event.
We expected to replicate the classic misinformation effect
with higher false memory rates for misinformed than for
non-misinformed items and that this effect would be more
pronounced in children than in adults. Drawing from find-
ings concerning test effects in the absence of misinforma-
tion, we expected better memory performance for items
that were tested compared to those that were untested. This
effect should be present across all age groups and for both
types of processing (meaning vs. item-specific). Given that
findings of the inoculation effect stand in stark contrast to
the findings of retrieval-enhanced suggestibility, the antici-
pated effect of immediate testing for misinformation items
was non-directional and analyses were conducted in a purely
exploratory manner.
Further, we hypothesized that meaning versus item-
specific processing might account for the divergent findings
in the extant literature such that participants who received
meaning questions should be more vulnerable to subsequent
misinformation than participants who received item-specific
questions. Thus, retrieval-enhanced suggestibility is more
likely to occur after immediate questioning at the meaning
level while an inoculation effect is more likely after immedi-
ate questioning on an item-specific level. Although the
ability to extract meaning and item-specific information
undergoes considerable developmental improvements, the
former development is more protracted than the latter
(Bjorklund, 1987; Brainerd et al., 2008; Howe et al.,
2009). Thus, we hypothesized that whereas item-specific
testing should be beneficial for all ages (inoculation effect),
meaning testing should affect younger children more
than older children, adolescents, and adults increasing their
retrieval-enhanced suggestibility. This is based on both
AAT and FTT predicting that false memories are more likely
to occur when meaning-based information is relied upon
instead of item-specific information. Furthermore, according
to the tenets of AAT and FTT, an age-related increase exists
in the ability to spontaneously extract the meaning (gist)
information of an event. Forced processing at the meaning
level through testing may enable younger children to better
extract relational information and this may have the negative
consequence of heightening false memory rates.
METHOD
Participants
Two-hundred-and-twenty participants took part in the
experiment. Specifically, 59 7/8-year-olds (Mage=7.78,
SD=0.62), 57 11/12-year-olds (Mage=11.94, SD=0.84),
53 14/15-year-olds (Mage=14.96, SD=0.62), and 51 adults
(Mage=22.32, SD=1.99) were tested in their native lan-
guage. Child and adolescent participants were recruited from
elementary schools and high schools in the Netherlands and
Germany. Consent of the school principals and parents were
obtained prior to testing. Adult participants were university
students, who received course credit or a 7.50€ voucher for
their participation and gave their informed consent prior to
participation. The study was approved by the standing
ethical committee of the Faculty.
Materials
Video
The 6:36-min version A of the video developed by
Takarangi, Parker, and Garry (2006), which depicts a
theft, was used as the stimulus film. It shows an electrician
wandering around a house repairing electrical objects and
using or stealing belongings from the owner. The video
includes eight critical items which have been shown to
reliably elicit a misinformation effect when erroneous
information was introduced after the video.
Immediate questions
The immediate testing phase consisted of paired questions
on nine items shown in the film. All participants answered
the same general what-questions (e.g., ‘What did Eric
wear?’). The follow-up questions were either on a meaning
or item-specific level. To elicit a meaning response, partici-
pants received a subsequent question asking for what the
item mentioned in the first question is used for (‘Why do
people wear trousers?’; see Appendix A online3 for a
complete list of questions for the meaning testing group).
Alternatively, to elicit an item-specific response, participants
received a subsequent question asking what kind of item
was mentioned in the first question (‘What kind of trousers
did Eric wear?’; see Appendix B online for a complete
list of questions for the item-specific testing group). A
two-alternative forced choice answer format was offered
for the general what-questions as well as the follow-up
3 All appendices can be viewed online in the Supporting Information.
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questions to ensure processing comparability across
conditions. Therefore, all participants received the same
questions and answers for the general question and a
follow-up question that was tailored to the previously given
answer. Whether option a or b was correct was selected
randomly and was the same for every participant (see
Appendix C online for the answer key for the immediate
questions). The order of the paired questions was random-
ized per participant.
The questions were developed based on the questionnaire
used by Takarangi et al. (2006). All participants received the
same general questions. A two-alternative answer format
was chosen to avoid floor-effects and to ensure processing
on the group-specific level. We used a theory-driven
approach that relied on assumptions derived from AAT and
FTT to construct the group-specific follow-up questions.
To assess the semantic knowledge and to trigger processing
on the meaning level, we added a follow-up question that
requested a meaning-based explanation to the first answer.
The item-specific questions were posed in a comparable
manner to the study of Pansky and Tenenboim (2011) in
the sense that the subsequent follow-up question prompted
a more specific answer to the first question. To assess
concrete event-specific knowledge and to trigger processing
on the item-specific level, we added a follow-up question
that requested an explanation in more detail. All participants
received paired questions—the same general question and a
follow-up question on either a meaning or an item-specific
level—independent of group allocation.
Misinformation
A 3:55-min eyewitness account of a female person describ-
ing the thief’s activities was played aloud to introduce misin-
formation. The written narrative used by Takarangi et al.
(2006) was translated into German and Dutch and minor
details were adjusted to resemble an eyewitness statement.
A full verbatim transcript can be obtained from the first
author upon request. The auditory summary contained
misinformation about eight items (see Appendix C online
for a specification of misinformed items). Half of these items
had been previously tested in the immediate question phase
on either the meaning or item-specific level (see Figure 1
for a visualization of the design and procedure). The column
labeled misinformation gives an overview of the composi-
tion of the items, which depends on their former reference
(column immediate testing and type of processing).
Final memory test
The final memory test consisted of the same 18 questions for
all participants (see Appendix D online). The questions were
posed in the more specific what kind of item-specific format
with two-alternative forced choice answer options. Eight
questions referred to the misled items from the eyewitness
account (see Figure 1). Four of these misinformed items
had been previously tested in the immediate testing phase.
The other 10 items were neutral and served as control items.
Five of these non-misinformed items were previously tested
in the immediate testing phase. Appendix C (online) gives
an overview of the answer key for the final memory test,
whether the item has been tested during immediate
questions or not, and if it was erroneously depicted within
the eyewitness account (misinformation manipulation).
Design
The experiment used a 4 (Age: 7/8 vs. 11/12 vs. 14/15years
vs. adults) × 2 (Type of Processing: meaning vs. item-specific
testing) × 2 (Immediate Testing: tested vs. untested) × 2
Figure 1. Overview of the design and procedure. Age and type of processing were between-subjects variables. Half of the participants of each
age group were tested with meaning questions while the other half received item-speciﬁc questions after viewing the target video on day 1.
The factors immediate testing and misinformation were manipulated within subjects and refer to the immediate questions on day 1 and the
misinformation via the eyewitness account on day 2
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(Misinformation: misinformation vs. no misinformation)
mixed factorial design. Age and type of processing served
as between-subjects variables while immediate testing and
misinformation were manipulated within-subject.
PROCEDURE
The experiment took place in quiet testing rooms at the
university or elementary/high school on two consecutive
days. Individual test sessions lasted approximately 15min.
Random group assignment was accomplished by providing
scoring sheets that either affiliated the participants with the
meaning or the item-specific group. Experimenters had no
influence on the group assignment. Roughly half of the
participants of each age group were allocated to the different
question groups.
On the first day of testing, participants saw the video of
the theft. After a short filler-task (Tetris, approximately
3min), participants were tested on a meaning or item-
specific level. One day later, participants listened to the
eyewitness account that contained misinformation. Follow-
ing a short filler task (Tetris, approximately 3min), the final
memory questions were asked in the same order as piloted
by Takarangi et al. (2006). These questions served as a final
memory test. They included items that were already
questioned on day one as well as new items. On half of these
untested and tested items, misinformation was introduced
on the second day (see Appendix C online for a detailed
description of these items).
RESULTS
We wanted to examine the effects of different types of
testing on the vulnerability to misinformation in different
age groups. To this end, we computed a 4 (Age: 7/8 vs.
11/12 vs. 14/15 years vs. adults) × 2 (Type of Processing:
meaning vs. item-specific testing) × 2 (Immediate Testing:
tested vs. untested) × 2 (Misinformation: misinformation
vs. no misinformation) mixed measures ANOVA. Four
dependent scores computed from the final memory test
served as the outcome variables. These concern the pro-
portion of incorrect answers on the tested and untested
misinformation and no misinformation items which was
used as a proxy measure of false memories.4 Table 1
gives an overview of the descriptives of the final memory
test scores.
Preliminary analyses
To determine whether our outcomes are because of item
characteristics rather than our specific manipulations, we
examined whether test scores on the first day affected
our final test outcomes independent of our misinformation
manipulation. To do this, we first performed an analysis
on item difficulty to assess whether items that were
misinformed on the second day differed from those items
that were non-misinformed prior to the introduction of
the misleading eyewitness account during immediate
testing on day one. To this end, we conducted a paired
sample t-test to compare the proportion of correct answers
to the immediate questions on day one in misinformed and
non-misinformed items. There was no statistically signifi-
cant difference between misinformed (Mcorrect=0.71,
SD=0.19) and non-misinformed items (Mcorrect=0.68,
SD=0.15) prior to the introduction of misinformation,
t(219) = 1.86, p=0.064, r=0.12. Thus, item difficulty
during immediate testing on day one did not differ.
Second, we performed a linear regression analysis on the
item level. This was performed solely for the misinformed
items. The combined final memory scores served as
dependent variables. These combined variables differenti-
ate between misinformed and non-misinformed items, but
not between tested or untested ones. The mean score of
misinformed items on day one served as predictor. No
significant effect was found, F(1, 218) = 1.85, p=0.176,
R2=0.008. The score on the misinformed items prior to
misinformation on day one did not influence the test score
after misinformation on day two. Thus, item difficulty on
day one did not account for the final test outcome on
day two. Therefore, the misinformation effects we report
next were not driven by item difficulty.
4 Note that slight violations in normality and homoscedasticity were ob-
served. Nevertheless, because of split samples bigger than 20 and a predom-
inance of low scores for the 14/15-year-olds, the model was not found to be
invalid.
Table 1. Mean proportion of incorrect answers in the ﬁnal memory test as a function of age, type of processing, immediate testing, and
misinformation
Tested items Untested items
Misinformation No misinformation Misinformation No misinformation
Age Type of processing M SD M SD M SD M SD
7/8 Meaning 0.43 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.56 0.22 0.39 0.24
Item 0.59 0.29 0.14 0.18 0.53 0.17 0.37 0.20
11/12 Meaning 0.54 0.23 0.09 0.13 0.54 0.19 0.23 0.20
Item 0.53 0.31 0.15 0.17 0.50 0.23 0.30 0.17
14/15 Meaning 0.49 0.33 0.03 0.07 0.52 0.20 0.25 0.19
Item 0.43 0.30 0.04 0.08 0.38 0.20 0.26 0.18
Adults Meaning 0.20 0.22 0.05 0.12 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.20
Item 0.20 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.36 0.20 0.18 0.16
Note. Mean scores were calculated by dividing the number of incorrect answers by the total number of items per condition and as such can range between 0
(all items were answered correct) and 1 (all items were answered incorrect).
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Main analyses
The predicted interaction between age, type of processing,
immediate testing, and misinformation was not statistically
significant, F(3, 212) = 2.23, p=0.085, ƞp2 = 0.03. However,
there were statistically significant three- and two-way inter-
actions which qualified the main effects (Table 2). Using
simple interactions and simple main effects, we specify the
interactive influences on the final memory score below.
Misinformation effect
The three-way interaction between age, type of processing,
and misinformation was statistically significant, F(3, 212)
= 2.98, p=0.032, ƞp2 = 0.04. All three-way interactions
including immediate testing were non-significant. Accord-
ingly, we combined the final memory scores across tested
and untested items. Figure 2 shows that the significant Age
× Type of processing × Misinformation interaction may stem
from differences in vulnerability to misinformation as a
factor of age and type of processing. Specifically, the effect
of misinformation versus no misinformation appears to be
smaller in adults who were tested in the meaning group
compared to all other ages and types of processing. To
confirm this impression, we first analyzed the simple Age
× Misinformation interaction on each level of type of
processing (meaning vs. item-specific testing). The results
showed that the simple Age × Misinformation interaction
was significant in the meaning testing group, F(3, 212)
= 9.17, p<0.001, ƞ2 = 0.12, but not in the item-specific
testing group, F(3, 212) =2.32, p=0.077, ƞ2 = 0.03.
To gain a deeper understanding of the significant Age ×
Misinformation interaction in the meaning testing group,
we subsequently looked at the second-order simple effect
of misinformation (misinformation vs. no misinformation)
on each level of age (7/8 vs. 11/12 vs. 14/15 years vs. adults)
in the meaning testing group. This analysis revealed that the
contaminating effect of misinformation differed as a function
of age. Although the misinformation effect was comparably
high in 11/12-year-olds (misinformation: M=0.54, SD=0.16,
no misinformation: M=0.16, SD=0.12), F(1, 216) =46.71,
p˂0.001, ƞ2 = 0.15, and 14/15-year-olds (misinformation:
M=0.51, SD=0.21, no misinformation: M=0.22,
SD=0.14), F(1, 216) =38.59, p˂ 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.12, it
was smaller in 7/8-year-olds (misinformation: M=0.49,
SD=0.17, no misinformation: M=0.29, SD=0.16), F(1,
216) = 14.61, p˂ 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.05, and non-significant in
Figure 2. Proportion of incorrect answers as a function of age and misinformation for meaning (left graph) and item-speciﬁc testing
(right graph). Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals
Table 2. Results of the four-way mixed measures ANOVA with age and type of processing as between-subject factors and immediate testing
and misinformation as within-subject factors
F df p ƞp
2
Age × type of processing × immediate testing ×misinformation 2.23 3 0.085 0.03
Age × type of processing × immediate testing 0.79 3 0.500 0.01
Age × type of processing ×misinformation 2.98 3 0.032 0.04
Age × immediate testing ×misinformation 2.47 3 0.063 0.03
Type of processing × immediate testing ×misinformation 0.67 1 0.415 0.00
Age × type of processing 1.22 3 0.305 0.02
Age × immediate testing 1.62 3 0.186 0.02
Age ×misinformation 8.80 3 <0.001 0.11
Type of processing × immediate testing 1.57 1 0.211 0.01
Type of processing ×misinformation 0.12 1 0.732 0.00
Immediate testing ×misinformation 32.03 1 <0.001 0.13
Age 37.78 3 <0.001 0.35
Type of processing 0.05 1 0.825 0.00
Immediate testing 71.29 1 <0.001 0.25
Misinformation 270.77 1 <0.001 0.56
Note. Signiﬁcant higher-order interactions are discussed in the text using simple interactions and simple main effects.
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adults (misinformation: M=0.23, SD=0.17, no misinforma-
tion: M=0.14, SD=0.12), F(1, 216) = 2.34, p=0.051,
ƞ2 = 0.01. Consequently, for the meaning tested sample, we
found a misinformation effect in children and adolescents,
but adults were not statistically affected by misinformation.
Note that adults had low rates of incorrect recognition in
misinformed as well as non-misinformed items. Even with
a more lenient p-value criterion, considering p=0.051 as
marginally significant, the effect of the difference between
these items would still be considered very low ƞ2 = 0.01.
That is, we only found little support for a misinformation
effect in adults. As predicted, the misinformation effect
was much stronger in younger than older children and
adolescents.
Testing effect
Interestingly, we did find a statistically significant two-way
interaction in which immediate testing played a role. The
two-way interaction between immediate testing and misin-
formation was significant, F(1, 212) =32.03, p<0.001,
ƞp2 = 0.13. Simple main effects showed that the misinforma-
tion effect was almost double the size after testing (misinfor-
mation: M=0.43, SD=0.29; no misinformation: M=0.10,
SD=0.14; F(1, 215) =241.93, p ˂ 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.50) compared
to no testing (misinformation: M=0.46, SD=0.23; no
misinformation: M=0.28, SD=0.20; F(1, 215) =81.64,
p˂0.001, ƞ2 = 0.27).5 This is illustrated in Figure 3 in which
the magnitude of the difference between the first and second
bar (difference of 0.33), reflecting the misinformation effect
for tested items, is considerably bigger than in the third and
fourth bar (difference of 0.18), reflecting the misinformation
effect for untested items respectively. Thus, ignoring type of
processing and age, immediate testing almost doubled the size
of the misinformation effect. Our data therefore support
retrieval-enhanced suggestibility. All other main effects and
interactions were non-significant.
DISCUSSION
The present study was designed to determine the effect of
different types of processing (meaning vs. item-specific) on
testing effects in relation to vulnerability to misinformation.
Extending previous studies, not only adults, but also children
and adolescents were tested immediately after having seen a
target event (i.e., theft). On a second testing day, misinfor-
mation was introduced using an eyewitness account. We
replicated the beneficial effect of immediate testing
(Roediger & Karpicke, 2006) and the harmful effect of
misinformation (Loftus, 2005) on memory performance.
Contrary to our expectation, our processing manipulation
in immediate testing did not play a pivotal role in partici-
pants’ subsequent vulnerability to misinformation. However,
immediate testing increased the misinformation effect
resulting in a clear retrieval-enhanced suggestibility effect.
This is, to our knowledge, the first evidence of a retrieval-
enhanced suggestibility effect in children. The results as
well as their implications are discussed in more detail in
the following paragraphs.
First, we found the predicted testing effect as described by
Roediger and Karpicke (2006), which manifested itself in
better memory performance for tested than for untested
items. Second, in addition to the testing effect, we replicated
the classic misinformation effect (e.g., Loftus, 2005). Here,
we found higher false memory rates for the items that were
misled than for those that were not misled across all ages.
Importantly, the misinformation effect was larger for tested
items than for untested items, supporting the notion of
retrieval-enhanced suggestibility. We are the first to show
this effect in a sample that not only included adults, but also
children and adolescents. Furthermore, consistent with previ-
ous developmental findings (see Bruck & Ceci, 1999, for a
review), the harmful effects of misinformation were more
pronounced in children than in adults. Adding to previous
studies that rarely included an adolescent age group
(as pointed out by Jack, Leov, & Zajac, 2013 and by
McGuire, London, & Wright, 2015), we showed that the
adolescents were nearly as susceptible to misinformation as
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach to analyz-
ing our data.
Figure 3. Proportion of incorrect answers as a function of immediate testing and misinformation. Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals
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the children. This suggests that adolescents’ eyewitness
reports should also be assessed cautiously and may not be
put on the same level as statements by adults. Consequently,
for adolescents as well as for children, a detailed analysis of
the circumstances under which statements were obtained is
important as is whether or not post-event misinformation
was possibly involved.
We were most interested in the effect of different types of
testing on the vulnerability to misinformation. We predicted
that item-specific testing could account for the inoculation
effect, while testing meaning might promote test-enhanced
suggestibility. We based our assumptions on theoretical con-
siderations and on a previous study investigating the effect
of different types of testing in adults (Pansky & Tenenboim,
2011). In an attempt to determine the source of discrepancies
with other studies, we conducted exploratory analyses into
the level of processing during testing. Because of the age
decrease in the vulnerability to misinformation (without
previous testing), we expected that the effects of testing
would be more pronounced in younger than older children
and adults.
Our results showed that the type of processing (meaning
vs. item-specific) apparently cannot account for the diverg-
ing findings regarding the impact of testing on the vulnera-
bility to misinformation. That is, surprisingly, there were
no overall differences as a function of meaning versus
item-specific testing. The only exception in which type of
processing had an influence was the adult group who was
tested on meaning (see the result section on the misinforma-
tion effect). Adults tested in the item-specific group, and
child and adolescent participants in both processing groups,
showed increases in incorrect recognition after misinforma-
tion versus no misinformation irrespective of type of
processing. However, adults tested in the meaning group
showed no higher incorrect recognition rates after misinfor-
mation compared to no misinformation. Consequently, only
for the adults tested in the meaning group were there no
harmful effects of misinformation, providing some support
for the inoculation effect.
Pansky and Tenenboim (2011) found that item-specific
(verbatim) testing and not meaning (gist) testing yielded an
inoculation effect of testing against misinformation in adults.
However, we found the opposite pattern, namely, that mean-
ing testing and not item-specific testing yielded some kind of
inoculation effect inasmuch as meaning testing in the adult
group prevented participants from falling prey to misinfor-
mation. This inconsistency may be because of differences
in how misinformation was introduced. An inoculation effect
of testing against misinformation was more frequently found
when misinformation was introduced via questions
(LaPaglia & Chan, 2013). Likewise, Pansky and Tenenboim
used such an approach whereas we embedded the misinfor-
mation into a narrative. This approach has been found to
favor test-enhanced suggestibility (LaPaglia & Chan,
2013), a pattern that was supported by our finding. Another
possible reason for the inconsistencies with Pansky and
Tenenboim is the diverging operationalization of the
types of processing. According to Pansky and Tenenboim,
item-specific (verbatim) processing, operationalized with a
two-word response approach, yielded an inoculation effect
whereas meaning (gist) processing, operationalized with a
one-word response approach, had no beneficial influence
on false memory rates. An alternative explanation for their
lower false memory rates in the two-word response group
is that repetitive testing of the critical item occurred,
compared to single testing in the one-word response group
that only received one question. Likewise, only the two-
word response condition focused on item-specific informa-
tion whereas the one-word response did not necessarily
trigger information retrieval at a meaning level as stipulated
by AAT or FTT. In the current study, we addressed these
limitations by employing a follow-up question not only for
the item-specific, but also the meaning group. This question
stimulated participants to think about why a depicted action,
for example the theft of jewelry, had been performed. If
repetitive questioning about an item accounted for the
inoculation effect, this effect should have been detectable
in the item-specific as well as the meaning testing group.
However, this pattern of results was not found in the present
experiment.
The question remains as to why we found a small inocula-
tion effect against misinformation in our adult meaning
testing group. The inoculation effect is thought to occur
because immediate testing strengthens the memory trace
for the original event (e.g., Wang et al., 2014). This advan-
tage preserves it from the subsequent, negative influences
of misinformation. Apparently, the immediately retrieved
information does not need to correspond entirely with the
later requested information. Although our immediate
meaning question led participants to process the underlying
meaning of the details witnessed, our final memory test
asked for item-specific information.
Besides the protective effect of meaning testing in adults,
we found no effects of testing on the susceptibility to
misinformation in other age groups. This may have been
because of either no influence of type of processing or a
failure in the induction of the manipulation. Even though
our operationalization of meaning and item-specific process-
ing was thought to emphasize the effect of testing on the
susceptibility to misinformation and to be more forensically
relevant, we did not find such an effect regardless of age.
We expected immediate meaning testing compared with
item-specific testing to elevate suggestibility to misinforma-
tion across all ages but, in particular, in younger children.
However, no age effect was found. This does give us insight
into the effect of different types of testing on subsequent
vulnerability to misleading information. Whereas younger
children are most prone to misinformation irrespective of
type of testing, adults might somewhat benefit from meaning
testing.
We tried to match our experiment as much as possible
to naturally occurring circumstances during a crime (i.e.,
witnessing a theft), without losing control over possible
extraneous factors. Naturally, because of ethical constraints
and the age of our youngest participants, we were not able
to show a highly upsetting video. It is known that stress,
which is likely experienced during a real crime, can negatively
influence memory (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, &
Kieman, 2004). However, others argue that the impact might
be neutral (e.g., Krix et al., 2016; Sauerland et al., 2016) or
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even positive (e.g., Roozendaal & McGaugh, 2011). Thus,
future research might also take the stress component into
account when trying to disentangle the inoculating effect from
test-enhanced suggestibility.
Another point to be considered is the answer format which
should be as free as possible to match real-life interview
techniques. The present study employed a forced-choice
answer format to ensure processing on either the meaning
or item-specific level. The advantage of such an answer
format is that even very young children understand what is
expected from them and no floor-effects emerge caused by
difficulties in understanding the instructions. However, no
differentiation between guessing and actually knowing can
be drawn in a forced-choice answer format. It is unknown
whether incorrect recognition rates were based on the
formation of a false memory or on the wrong choice when
no memory could be retrieved. Thus, we did not base our
conclusions on absolute incorrect recognition rates but on
differences in incorrect recognition rates between the
conditions.
To conclude, this study sheds light on whether immediate
interviewing has a beneficial or harmful effect on delayed
memory performance. Although it did not provide evidence
for the idea that type of processing is a crucial factor
concerning inoculation versus retrieval-enhanced suggest-
ibility, it did address questions about the nature of these
opposing findings. One implication of our findings is that
immediate conversations with other witnesses or bystanders,
emergency personnel, or police officers at the crime scene do
not necessarily impair memory consolidation processes. On
the contrary, immediate testing can have beneficial effects
when witnesses are not subsequently influenced by errone-
ous information. However, avoiding such an influence is
nearly impossible. Indeed, our findings support the conclu-
sion that testing may increase the magnitude of the misinfor-
mation effect at all ages. Therefore, it is crucial to better
understand when immediate testing does (or does not)
make participants vulnerable to subsequently incorporating
misinformation into their memory of the witnessed (target)
event.
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